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Electronic reputation or “feedback” mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems 
associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in 
more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another’s 
dealings.  In this paper, we compare trading in a market with online feedback (as implemented 
by many Internet markets) to a market without feedback, as well as to a market in which the 
same people interact with one another repeatedly (partners market).  We find that, while the 
feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, it also 
exhibits a kind of public goods problem in that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust 
and trustworthy behavior go to the whole community and are not completely internalized.  We 
discuss the implications of this perspective for improving feedback systems. 
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1.  Introduction: The problem of trust in online markets 
Many online markets rely on electronic reputation or “feedback” systems to promote trust 
in transactions.  The reliance on reputation per se does not distinguish online markets from 
traditional markets, legal enforcement being in all cases expensive.  On balance, however, online 
markets have more problems with fraud.  A recent report by the research group GartnerG2 
(2002) concludes that "Internet transaction fraud is 12 times higher than in-store fraud."  A U.S. 
Department of Justice (2002) survey also cites high levels of online fraud, pointing especially at 
frauds common on auction sites (many with online feedback systems) that “induce their victims 
to send money for the promised items, but then deliver nothing or only an item far less valuable 
than what was promised (e.g., counterfeit or altered goods).”
1
The power of reputation to promote trust in business transactions is closely associated 
with networked communities, places where there is a good deal of interpersonal communication 
as well as exchange.  Online and traditional markets are networked in different ways.  Whether 
the networking pattern is critical to the amount of trust in the market is a matter of contention.  
The laboratory experiments we present in this paper investigate how differences in the flow of 
information – that is, the source of the information and how it disseminates in the market – might 
differentially influence trust.  Our results imply that, even if information about reputation is 
shared and reliable, online feedback systems provide fewer incentives to trust or to be 
trustworthy than do traditional markets, where long-term relationships play a larger role.  The 
results also suggest ways in which online incentives might be improved. 
In traditional business communities, the patterns of information flow and contact that 
promote trust often interact in subtle ways.  Vietnam’s free market reform in the mid-1980’s 
illustrates how effective informal reputational controls can be.  At the time, there was little in the 
way of legal protection against exchange malfeasance, but markets nevertheless flourished.   
According to McMillan (2002), “People in the same line of business would meet each other 
 
1 Other evidence comes from the U.S. White Collar Crime Center and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2001). 
The Center reports that 63 percent of the 49,711 formal complaints received in 2001 involved either non-delivery of 
merchandise, non-payment, or auctions, and that these numbers are rising rapidly. 2
every day in teahouses and bars …to discuss the reliability of particular customers. … About half 
of a sample of entrepreneurs said that they had had no prior connections with the businesses that 
were to become long-standing trading partners.”  Thus, in traditionally networked communities, 
interaction between members promotes trust in two ways.  For one, the pattern of interaction 
promotes long-term relationships; a business partner whose trust has been rewarded is, all things 
equal, more likely to return to do future business.  Second, information about individual 
reliability is transmitted by word-of-mouth to third parties, some of whom are prospective future 
trading partners.
2
One of the great advantages of online markets is the opportunity to trade with a larger, 
fluctuating set of partners.  This means lesser reliance on long-term relationships.  In fact, in data 
collected from eBay over a five month period, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) found that 89 
percent of all encounters were one-shot.  To promote the exchange of information on the 
reliability of individual traders, many platforms, including Amazon, Cnet, eBay, Half, and 
Yahoo, have instituted online reputation mechanisms, known as “feedback” systems, to provide 
the kind of word-of-mouth available in traditionally networked markets.  Online feedback 
systems arguably improve the flow of word-of-mouth reputational information in the sense that 
accessing information online does not require personal contacts in the trading community, and 
feedback information from large numbers of traders can easily be collected, processed and 
disseminated.  Amazon’s used books market platform for independent dealers (brick-and-mortar 
bookstores as well as private individuals) provides a simple but illustrative example of how these 
systems work.  Sellers post the price and a description of the book’s condition on Amazon’s site.  
Buyers pay through Amazon, who takes a percentage, but sellers ship directly to buyers.  The 
moral hazard problems inherent in the seller’s side of the deal – stipulating the book’s condition 
 
2 Use of reputation to enforce trustworthiness is perhaps as old as human social interaction.  Alexander (1987) 
argues that reputation mechanisms are at the base of human moral systems.  Greif (1989) investigates the reputation 
systems to facilitate trust among strangers, used by certain groups of Mediterranean traders during the Middle Ages.   
Milgrom et al. (1990) provide a historical as well as theoretical account of the role of trade fairs in disseminating 
reputation information during the Middle Ages.  See Buchan et al. (2002) for a cultural comparison of trust and 
trustworthiness. 3
and the shipping – is addressed through the feedback system in which buyers are invited to post 
comments on the transaction that future buyers can view when deciding whether to make a 
purchase.
3 Recent field studies of online auction platforms find that feedback systems have at 
least some of the desired economic effect in the sense that reputable sellers are more likely to sell 
their items (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002), and can expect price premiums (e.g., Lucking-
Reiley et al., 1999).
4
One way of stating the difference between online and traditional reputation networks is to 
note that they emphasize different types of reciprocity.  Traditional markets rely more on direct 
reciprocity: ‘I trust you because you were trustworthy with me before.’  Online markets rely 
more on indirect reciprocity: ‘I trust you because you were trustworthy with others before.’  In 
both cases, information about reputation enforces trust by inducing a reciprocal response; past 
trustworthiness is a prerequisite to future business.  The two differ, however, in terms of the flow 
of information. In particular, in direct reciprocal dealings, traders make decisions based on 
reputational information culled from their own past transactions, and their present dealings 
produce information that they themselves will use in the future.  But in indirect reciprocal 
dealings, reputational information is obtained from others, and others will use information from 
the present dealings in the future.
5
Putting our investigation in these terms, we look at how well markets based on indirect 
reciprocity build and sustain trust in comparison to markets based on direct reciprocity.  Game 
theoretic models imply that indirect reciprocity can be just as effective as direct reciprocity, so 
long as traders in indirect reciprocal relationships have access to sufficient information about 
 
3 Here is how eBay (2002) explains their feedback system: “A user's feedback is a key factor people use to 
determine whether or not they want to trade with that user. What feedback you give or receive is an important part 
of your trading reputation at ebay. […] If you're a buyer, checking a seller's Feedback Profile before you make a bid 
is one of the smartest and safest moves you can make. This Feedback Profile answers many questions about how a 
seller does business.” 
4 Analogous results come from Ba and Pavlou (2002), Houser and Wooders (2001), Melnik and Alm (2002), and 
Ockenfels (2003); see Resnick et al. (2002) and Dellarocas (forthcoming) for recent surveys.  Brynjolfsson and 
Smith (2000) compared pricing behavior at 41 Internet and conventional retail outlets.  They identify internet 
sellers’ trustworthiness as one important factor that affects market outcomes. 
5 See Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Dellarocas (2001), and Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), for detailed 
comparisons of electronic and conventional dissemination of information about reputation.     4
reputations; that is, game theoretic models imply what we will call the information hypothesis: It 
is the information per se, independent of its flow, that matters.  Standing in counterpoint to the 
information hypothesis is an argument that says that the flow of information is, in fact, critical.  
Granovetter (1985), for example, in discussing market trust, argues that people put more stock in 
information acquired “from one’s own dealings.”  This suggests that direct reciprocity is a more 
effective way of developing trust even when sufficient information for indirect reciprocity is 
present.  But even if so, understanding why the information flows matter might help to improve 
online trust.  
Section 2 develops the information hypothesis, and discusses the counter argument.   
Section 3 then details the design of the experiment.  Section 4 lays out results.  Section 5 
discusses the implications for improving online markets.  
 
2.  Three markets and the information hypothesis 
  To put matters on a tangible footing, we describe the fundamental trust problem in the 
context of a simple market platform.  Using this platform as a base, we characterize three 
specific markets that differ by the flow of information.  We then describe the information 
hypothesis in the context of these markets.   
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2.1 The basic trading platform for three markets 
In each market, transactions take place over a series of rounds.  (In the experiments, of 
course, there will be a finite number of rounds, but the number of rounds Q finite or infinite Q is 
not critical to our basic argument.)  At the beginning of each round, a potential buyer is matched 
with a potential seller.  The buyer then chooses whether to purchase an item at a fixed price.  If 
the purchase order is sent, the seller decides whether to ship or simply keep the buyer’s money.  
The moral hazard is that, on receiving the money from the buyer, the seller has no immediate 
pecuniary incentive to ship the item.  Thus, a transaction that is in both parties interests may be 
impeded either because the seller proves untrustworthy, or because the buyer, anticipating this 
risk, chooses not to trust. 
Figure 1 illustrates the exact moves in the buyer-seller encounter.  Both the seller and the 
buyer are endowed with 35, which is the payoff when no trade takes place.  The seller offers an 
item for sale at a price of 35 which has a value of 50 to the buyer.  The seller’s cost of providing 
the buyer with the item Q costs associated with executing the trade, shipping, handling, as well as 
production costs Q is 20.
6 So each successfully completed trade increases efficiency by creating 
a consumer surplus of 15 and a net profit of 15 for the seller.  If the buyer chooses to buy the 
item, he sends his endowment of 35 to the seller, who then has to decide whether to ship the 
item.  If the seller does not ship, he receives the price plus his endowment of 35 for a total of 70.  
If he ships, he receives the price minus the costs plus his endowment for a total of 50.  If the 
buyer chooses not to buy the item, no trade occurs.  In this sense, the buyers can choose with 
whom to trade and with whom not to trade. 
  The three markets are characterized as follows:  In the strangers market, individual 
buyers and sellers meet no more than once and the buyer has no information about the seller’s 
transaction history.  Here the moral hazard has full force, since the actions of the seller are not 
conveyed to future perspective customers.  In the feedback market, an online feedback system 
 
6 These are production costs where either the seller produces the item after he knows the demand, or the product is 
produced before the buyer’s decision is known but costs are not sunk (e.g., when the item can be resold at a price 
equal to production costs). 6
tracks seller histories of shipping decisions and provides this information to prospective buyers.  
This affords the type of indirect reciprocity associated with online markets.  In the partners 
market, the same buyer-seller pairs interact repeatedly, in every round.  This affords the type of 
direct reciprocity associated with more traditional markets. 
 
2.2. The information hypothesis 
The critical question we investigate is whether the flow of information, in addition to the 
information content, affects trust and trustworthy behavior.  If not, then feedback and partners 
markets should, in theory, produce just as much trustworthy exchange.  If so, then partners 
markets may have an advantage.      
A robust finding of game theoretic investigations of reputation building is that a market 
networked for indirect reciprocity can support just as much trustworthy exchange as a market 
networked for direct reciprocity.  That is, standard game theory implies the information 
hypothesis  (our null hypothesis), that information about reputation determines trusting and 
trustworthy behavior independent of the pattern of the flow of information. 
To illustrate the reasoning behind the hypothesis, suppose that a buyer in a partners 
relationship suffers from short-term memory loss and always forgets the outcome of the last 
buying encounter.  The incentive for the seller to be honest disappears with the information in 
the buyer’s head.  But now suppose that some feedback mechanism reminds the forgetful buyer 
of what the seller did last time.  Now the incentive is restored – even if, be the buyer aware or 
not, the information is about a different seller than the one the forgetful buyer dealt with last.  
For the seller to have an incentive to be trustworthy, he need only expect that a future buyer will 
punish or reward his behavior; whether these punishments or rewards come from the same or 
from different buyers is irrelevant.  The buyer, to induce this trustworthiness, need only be 
equipped with sufficient information about the sellers’ histories; whether this information comes 
from one’s own experience or from different sources is irrelevant.  This is the basic message that 7
derives from the game theoretic models: it is the information, not its source or its dissemination, 
that matters (ex., Kreps et al., 1982, Ellison, 1994).  
That said, precisely how much exchange game theory predicts will occur in these markets 
depends on the specific modeling approach taken.  In this regard, a critical issue is whether the 
model assumes that traders have complete information about one another’s payoffs (different 
from information about reputation).  The payoffs can include psychological as well as pecuniary 
awards.  The simplest analysis assumes common knowledge of payoffs, and that the pecuniary 
rewards shown in Figure 1 are the sole rewards.  Given this, when the market has a finite number 
of rounds there is a unique (Nash) equilibrium, found by backwards induction: In the final round 
of play, the seller’s optimal action is not ship, and so the buyer’s optimal action in the last round 
is to exercise the outside option.  This is true regardless of whatever seller feedback the buyer 
has, or of whether buyer and seller are strangers or partners.  And since there is no trading in the 
last round, there is no incentive to ship in the next to last round, and so the buyer’s optimal 
action in the next to last round is again the outside option, and so on… back to the 1
st round. The 
equilibrium implies no trade in any round of strangers, feedback or partners markets.  
It turns out that this analysis is highly sensitive to the common knowledge assumption.  
Kreps et al. (1982) demonstrate, in the context of a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, that if 
each player assesses even a small positive probability that his partner receives some 
psychological reward beyond the pecuniary reward for cooperating, then there are (sequential) 
equilibria in which rational players cooperate, at least until the last few rounds of play.  To see 
the intuition in the context of our markets, suppose buyers believe there is a small proportion of 
sellers who will ship out of, say, a sense of social responsibility.  Buyers will buy only if the 
seller has shipped for orders received in the past (failure to ship reveals the seller as not honest).  
This gives all sellers a pecuniary incentive to ship since doing so is a prerequisite for future 
business.  Of course, for this to work, seller past actions must be observable to the buyer – a 
condition that holds equally in the feedback and partners market, but not strangers.  Thus, this 8
model implies there should be the same number of transactions in feedback and partners markets, 
but few, if any, transactions in strangers.
7
The analyses so far suppose that traders exit the market after a fixed and known number 
of rounds, as they do in our experiments.  We note, however, that the infinite horizon case, where 
there is no maximal amount of time traders can be in the market,  retains the critical implication 
of the information hypothesis; there is, from a game theoretic perspective, no reason to expect 
different exchange patterns in feedback and partners markets, and exchange will not take place in 
the strangers market (Ellison, 1994, Ockenfels, 2003, and the references cited therein).  Thus, the 
information hypothesis, that equal information leads to an equal amount of trade, is robust to all 
of these models, even though the predicted amount of trade is model dependent.  
Still, there are reasons to suspect that information flows matter.  For one, in a partners 
market, the reputational information available about one’s partner, and one’s own history of 
transactions, precisely match.  In a feedback market, however, the two are non-intersecting sets.  
The game theory models, and so the information hypothesis, imply that only the history of one’s 
partner should matter to behavior, and so this difference in own and partner histories is 
superfluous to these models.  But it seems plausible that one’s history with one set of partners 
might influence trust and trustworthiness with other partners, which is in fact what our analysis 
will suggest.  It will also suggest that there is a kind of information dilemma at work in the 
feedback markets, associated with the fact that, in these markets, reputational information is a 
public good benefiting all and not only those who produced the information.  
 
7 Kreps et al. (1982) prove an even stronger result: Even if all players’ payoffs are correctly described as in our 
Figure 1, if this is not common knowledge, trust and trustworthiness may emerge in equilibrium.  However, as with 
Kreps et al.’s model, the formal incomplete information model for our markets would be technically demanding, and 
we will not attempt to work such a model out here, but see Bolton and Ockenfels (2003).  Game theoretic models in 
which people are assumed to care about social as well as pecuniary payoffs can explain data patterns across a wide 
variety of experimental games (ex., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; the latter make 
explicit connection to the Kreps et al. model, Section VI.D).  Güth and Ockenfels (forthcoming) review the theory 
literature on the evolution of preferences in trust games not unlike the one we study.  They show that depending on 
the institutional environment trustworthy behavior may survive evolutionary competition.  Both of these lines of 
research suggest that trustworthiness and trust can have non-strategic as well as strategic causes.  Our experiments 
measure the extent to which trust and trustworthiness is intrinsically or strategically motivated. 9
In addition, Granovetter (1985) puts forward a number of reasons why one might put 
special weight on one’s own dealings rather than on reputation information provided by others, 
having to do with social ties or the costs of gathering or quality of information.  While these 
differences are not relevant to our laboratory markets, they may well be relevant to real world 
online markets Q and they tend to reinforce what we will find (as we explain in section 5).   
 
3. Experimental design 
Our experiment compares the strangers market to the feedback market as a method of 
measuring the improvement in trust and trustworthiness feedback brings about, keeping the 
trader matching scheme fixed.  The comparison also permits us to gauge the extent to which 
information about reputation is used strategically.  We then compare the performance of the 
feedback market with that of the partners market to judge the accuracy of the information 
hypothesis.  A deeper analysis of this data permits us to investigate how the flow of information 
affects trust and trustworthiness. 
Our experiment focuses on the role of differing patterns of information flow, and so our 
design carefully excludes other potentially confounding factors.  For example, we control for the 
noise in feedback production, always truthfully provided in our experiment (see Ba, 2001, 
Dellarocas, 2001, and Ba et al., 2003, on the incentives and consequences of online identity and 
feedback manipulation).  We control the distribution of individual valuations and knowledge of 
these valuations in all markets, and we focus on the effect of reputation on the probability of 
trade by keeping the price fixed across markets.  Many of these factors, and their influence on 
trust, are interesting in their own right and deserving of broader investigation.  Our experiment 
provides sufficient framework to address them in future investigations, in a way that might be 
difficult to do in the field.
8
8 See Roth (2002) and Ariely et al. (2002) on the relationship between experimental and field studies. 10
 
3.1 Implementing the markets 
The payoffs in Figure 1 were used in all three markets, and (both buyer and seller) 
payoffs were known to all.  Each payoff point in Figure 1 was worth $0.01 to the participant.  
The gains from trade are about 40% (a gain of 15 on the outside option of 35).  This will prove to 
be sufficient to induce a high level of transaction in at least some of the markets (Bolton et al., 
2002, show that the size of the gains from trade can influence trust in a reputation market). 
The markets ran for 30 rounds.  This length was made public knowledge to participants at 
the beginning of all three markets.  Doing so allows us to observe endgame behavior as a 
measure of strategic reputation building since the strategic value of a good reputation diminishes 
in the last rounds.  In addition, not stating the market end risks loss of experimental control.
9
In the strangers market, buyers and sellers are randomly paired in each round under the 
commonly known restriction that nobody is matched with the same player in the same role more 
than once.  Buyers and sellers are anonymous to one another, and no information about one 
another’s history of action is made available.  The random matching is public knowledge.  
Matching is done the same way in the feedback market (we used the same pairing 
rotation used in the strangers market; in particular, no buyer is matched more than once with a 
specific seller), but here buyers are given the feedback on the seller’s shipping decisions prior to 
choosing whether to buy.  The feedback includes the total number of times the seller shipped in 
the past, as well as a round-by-round history of their shipping decisions.  Figure A1 in Appendix 
A displays a typical computer screen.  We find that the kind of tree representation we used leads 
to better understanding of the game.  Also, the computer highlights the path of play on the tree as 
the game progresses, so subjects can know where they are in the game and how they got there. 
In the partners market, matching is fixed; that is, the same two subjects are always paired 
together, and this is public knowledge.  The same kind of feedback information available to 
 
9 Participants would still guess at the market end, making for unobservable “endgame” behavior, and since 
unobservable, potentially confounded with other factors.  A design in which the market randomly stops or continues 
after each round introduces risk-over-stopping as a factor, again not directly observable.  Note that, since 
participants in all markets were told of the 30 rounds, this cannot explain the differences we observe across markets.   11
feedback market buyers is available to partners market buyers.  In this way, the information 
structure is parallel across the two markets, albeit the information is redundant in the sense that it 
is telling the buyers things the buyer has himself experienced. 
 
3.2 Experimental protocol 
The written instructions given to participants, reproduced in Appendix A, describe the 
protocol for the experiment in detail.  Here is a synopsis:  Each of the three markets consisted of 
three sessions.  There were 16 subjects per session (48 per market) for a total of 144 participants 
in the experiment.  All sessions were conducted in March and April of 2002 at the Laboratory for 
Economic Management and Auctions (LEMA) in the Smeal College of Business, Penn State 
University.  Subjects were Penn State University students, mostly undergraduates, from various 
fields of study who volunteered through an on-line recruitment system.  Cash was the only 
incentive to participate.  Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were seated at the computers, 
separated by partitions.  They were asked to read the instructions.  To create public knowledge, 
the monitor read instructions to subjects out loud.  Subjects then played several practice games in 
a sequence of roles that was chosen at random, with the computer as partner making its moves at 
random.  To encourage subjects to explore the features of the game interface, practice game 
payoffs were displayed as the Marx brothers: Chico, Groucho, Harpo and Zeppo.  Once familiar 
with the game interface, subjects played the 30 actual rounds.  Upon completion of the session, 
each subject was privately paid his or her earnings in cash plus a $5 show-up fee.   
 
4.  Results 
  We first describe the basic treatment effects we observe.  While access to reputation 
information induces a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, partners markets 
perform significantly better than feedback markets.  We then investigate the extent to which 
traders build and respond to reputation in a strategic manner.  This establishes the foundation 
necessary to investigate why the feedback market’s flow of information creates inferior 
incentives to trust and to be trustworthy.  12
4.1 Treatment effects 
  The major treatment effects have to do with trading patterns, to which there are three 
dimensions:  Efficiency or the percentage of potential transaction completed (Figure 2), trust or 
the percentage of buy orders given (Figure 3), and trustworthiness or the percentage of shipped 
items conditioned on buy orders (Figure 4).  In these figures, the treatment data has been 
aggregated across sessions. 
 




































































  The same pattern is evident in all three figures:  There is the least efficiency, trust and 
trustworthiness in the strangers market, more of all three in the feedback market, and more still 
in the partners market.  For example, averaged over all rounds, feedback yields 2.8 times the 
efficiency of strangers, and partners yields 1.8 times the efficiency of feedback.   
Comparing the treatments pair-wise, with sessions as the individual observations, support 
these conclusions (t-test p-value < 0.025 in all cases save for comparing average buying between 
strangers and feedback, p-value = 0.08, one-tailed tests, assuming equal variances).  This rejects 
the information hypothesis.
10 
Note too from Figures 2-4, the marked differences across treatments in round-to-round 
trading dynamics.  For the strangers market, there is a strong downward trend in efficiency, trust 
and trustworthiness.  The trends for feedback and partners markets, however, appear to be quite 
stable, save for the last two rounds when trading collapses.   
 
10 A non-parametric rank test on session observations yields similar results, with p = 0.05 for all but the strangers-
feedback comparison where p = 0.10 (one-tailed tests).   14
Table 1.  Random effects probit models, buyers
a
Maximum likelihood estimates [and two-sided p-values] for buyer behavior 
Dependent variable = “1” for buy 
Independent variable: Coefficient [p-value]  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
CONSTANT  0.533     
[.0040] 
0.347     
[.0185] 
0.524      
[.0001] 
FEEDBACK 
= 1 if buyer is from feedback treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.020   
[.9473] 
0.200    
[.4347] 
PARTNERS 
  = 1 if buyer is from partners treatment, and 0 else. 
0.963    
[.0001] 
1.48      
[.0000] 
0.852      
[.0011] 
TOTALSHIPfeedback 
= number of seller ships prior to last order. 
0.0616    
[.0014] 
TOTALNOSHIPfeedback 
  = number of seller no ships prior to last order. 
  -0.124     
[.0144] 
SHIPLASTfeedback 




















= number of past times item was shipped to buyer. 






  = number of past times buyer bought but not shipped. 






= round in strangers treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.062   
[.0000] 
ROUNDfeedback 
  = round in feedback treatment, and 0 else. 




= round in partners treatment, and 0 else. 
0.006    
[.4806] 
LAST2ROUNDstrangers 
  = 1 if round 29 or 30 in strangers treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.151   
[.6414] 
-0.390   
[.1649] 
-0.404     
[.1671] 
LAST2ROUNDfeedback 
= 1 if round 29 or 30 in feedback treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.903   
[.0000] 
-0.944     
[.0000] 
-0.974     
[.0000] 
LAST2ROUNDpartners 
  = 1 if round 29 or 30 in partners treatment, and 0 else. 
-1.15     
[.0000] 
-1.200   
[.0000] 




0.399      
[.0000] 
0.456    
[.0000] 
.444        
[.0000] 













aAnalogous estimates for fixed effects linear models are given in Table B1 of Appendix B. 
bHistory for partners buyers does not include last transaction. 
 
Model 1 of Table 1 refines our understanding of both the base treatment effects and 
trading dynamics.  Model 1 estimates the probability a buyer will decide to buy using a random 
effect probit regression.  The model includes three blocks of variables; one block for treatment 15
effects (FEEDBACK, PARTNERS, with the default being strangers), another for ROUND 
effects, and a third for endgame effects (LAST2ROUND).  Endgame effects include the last two 
rounds because, while player roles were switched randomly, they were told they would be a 
seller (buyer) for half the rounds, so that in round 29 a seller may be in his last round as a seller 
and thus has no strategic reason to be trustworthy.  Random effects account for the effects due to 
the idiosyncrasies of the decision makers in the sample (Greene, 1992).  The bracketed numbers 
in Table 1 are two-tailed p-values for the estimated coefficients.  Analogous probit models for 
the seller behavior are omitted here but yield the same qualitative conclusions (see also Table 2 
in section 4.2).  Models 2 and 3 of Table 1 elaborate on Model 1 and are discussed in section 4.4.   
The Model 1 FEEDBACK and PARTNERS coefficients permit a comparison of initial 
trust levels across treatments.  The coefficient for FEEDBACK is small and insignificant, 
indicating that there is little initial difference in trust across strangers and feedback markets.  The 
coefficient for PARTNERS, however, is positive and significant, indicating that partners market 
buyers are initially more trusting than their counterparts in strangers and feedback markets. 
ROUNDstrangers captures the strong negative trend in trust across rounds of the 
strangers market.  ROUNDfeedback is also significantly negative but substantially and 
significantly higher than ROUNDstrangers (two-tail p = 0.0106, Wald test).  In contrast, the 
ROUNDpartners coefficient is slightly positive but not significant.    
Hence, by Model 1, buyers in feedback markets are initially about as trusting as in 
strangers markets.  Trust declines quickly, however, in strangers markets, and slowly in feedback 
markets.  In contrast, trust in partners markets is stable at a level that is higher than in the other 
two markets.  At the same time, there are large and significant end-game effects in both feedback 
and partners but not in strangers, indicated by the LAST2ROUND variables.  
 
4.2 Comparing strangers and feedback: The strategic benefits of trust and trustworthiness 
An online feedback mechanism can help promote trade if traders use reputation 
information strategically.  Specifically, if buyers condition their behavior on the shipping history 16
of their sellers, then this gives sellers a strategic incentive to avoid spoiling their reputation.  
Comparing buyer and seller behavior in the strangers market to that in the feedback market 
supports the view that buyer and seller behavior is largely, if imperfectly, strategic in nature.   
 
















































* The base rate (the zero line) is the average buy over all encounters for each 
treatment separately (37.08 percent in strangers, 55.56 percent in feedback 
and 83.22 percent in partners). 
 
Figure 5 shows the marginal effects on the probability of trust in all markets depending 
on whether the seller shipped the last order (‘trustworthy’) or not (‘untrustworthy’).  In the 
strangers market, the marginal effect is close to zero since buyers do not see seller histories.  
(The effects are slightly negative since the bars do not include “newbies” Q sellers who have not 
been trusted yet Q and since buy rates in strangers decline rapidly.)  Buyers in feedback markets, 
on the other hand, strongly condition their behavior on the seller’s last feedback.  In absolute 
terms, they trust with probability 33 percent if the seller did not ship the last order, and with 
about twice this probability, 65 percent, if he shipped the last order.  (Formal statistical analysis 
for these effects is discussed in section 4.4.) 
Strangers           Feedback            Partners 17
This conditional buying is sensible since the seller’s history has predictive power for his 
future performance.  Table 2 presents a random effect probit for the seller’s decision.  We see 
that shipping the last time for a feedback market seller who received a buy order is a significant 
predictor of whether the seller will do so this time.  (The coefficient for LASTSHIPstrangers is 
significant as well but with a negative sign.)   
 
Table 2.  Random effects probit model, sellers 
Maximum likelihood estimates [and two-sided p-values] for seller behavior 
Dependent variable = “1” for ship 
Independent variable  Coefficient 
[p-value] 
Independent variable  Coefficient 
[p-value] 




-0.366     
[.0713] 
FEEDBACK  0.278      
[.2666] 








0.898     
[.0000] 
ROUNDstrangers  -0.037       
[.0008] 












-0.007     
[.4589] 
LAST2ROUNDpartners  -1.833      
[.0000] 
RHO  0.204    
[.0000] 






.0000   
aVariable interpretations are analogous to those given in Table 1. 
 
Finally, the strong end-game effect exhibited by both buyers and sellers in feedback 
markets (Tables 1 and 2) also supports the view that it is the strategic incentive to ship created by 
the ‘shadow of the future,’ as opposed to, say, an intrinsic preference for being trustworthy, that 
largely drives the efficiency-enhancing effect of the feedback mechanism.   
Of course, the fact that sellers in strangers ship some 36 percent of the time indicates that 
not all trustworthy behavior can be explained by strategic response to the pecuniary incentives.  
We might dismiss this as due to inexperience since most of the trading in strangers comes in the 
early rounds.  However, even in the very final rounds of feedback and partners markets, some 
buyers still buy and some still ship.  The buying might be attributed to naiveté, but the shipping 18
is harder to explain this way since shippers know they are doing this for the last time.  It would 
appear that some behavior reflects an intrinsic propensity for trusting or trustworthy behavior. 
 
4.3 Comparing feedback and partners: The public benefits of trust and trustworthiness  
Figures 2-4 show that partners markets are more successful in promoting exchange than 
feedback markets.  Figure 5 additionally shows that buyers in the partners market respond more 
strongly to the sellers’ histories than do buyers in feedback.  Further, from Table 2, notice that a 
last decision to ship is more highly predictive of future shipping in partners than in feedback 
markets (two-tailed p = 0.0121, Wald test).  This section investigates why reputation information 
has differential impact on trading patterns in feedback and partners markets. 
The thrust of our arguments is that, unlike in a partners relationship, feedback and one’s 
own past experience do not perfectly overlap in feedback markets.  This creates effects of 
trusting and being trustworthy that are not internalized by the reputation mechanism in the 
feedback market as they are in the partners market.  We first explain this phenomenon with some 
simple descriptive statistics to illustrate the points.  We then discuss the analogous inferential 
evidence. 
A trusting buyer in a feedback market generates valuable feedback information for other 
buyers who meet the same seller in the future.  A trusting buyer in a partner relationship 
generates the same valuable feedback information Q but entirely for himself.  Thus, the 
informational benefits from trusting (as opposed to the pecuniary gains from the immediate 
trade) are internalized in transactions among partners but not in transactions among feedback 
market traders.  Thus, all other things equal, the overall benefits from trusting are smaller in 
feedback.  We call this the informational dilemma.
11 
11 There is a related but distinct public goods problem of feedback provision observed by Resnick and Zeckhauser 
(2002), among others: Once the transaction is concluded, buyers have no incentives to provide others with feedback 
about their experience.  (Resnick and Zeckhauser report that on eBay nevertheless feedback was provided in about 
half the time.)  Since in our experiments feedback was produced automatically, this public good problem was not an 
issue (and in this sense our results overestimate the merits of a feedback mechanism that is based on voluntary 
feedback production).  19
In the data, the informational dilemma is particularly apparent if a buyer is matched with 
a newbie, a seller with no prior feedback history.  The average trust in newbies ranges from 65 
percent in strangers, to 77 percent in feedback, to 93 percent in partners.  While the difference 
between the strangers market and the other markets can be explained by the fact that newbies in 
the strangers market have no strategic reason to be trustworthy, the difference between feedback 
and partners may be explained by the informational dilemma.  In fact, buying from a newbie in 
the feedback market on average yielded a loss, namely 31 cents, less than the 35 cents from not 
buying.  Buying from a seller who shipped the last order, on the other hand, yielded an average 
payoff of 40 cents, and buying from a seller who did not ship the last order yielded 17 cents.
12
(In contrast, trusting a newbie seller in the partners market had an expected value of 40 cents.)  
Thus, a buyer in the feedback market is, in fact, better off trusting somebody only if he or she has 
already been shown to be trustworthy.     
 
Table 3. Buying probabilities 
Marginal effects of the buyers’ most recent history and the sellers’ 
most recent decision on the buying probability (in percent)* 
Market (average buy rate) 
  Buyer’s last experience 
  Seller’s most recent decision 
  Untrustworthy          Trustworthy 
Strangers  (37 percent)     
Exploited  Q 9.91  Q 7.63 
Rewarded  6.16 5.61 
Feedback (56 percent)     
Exploited  Q 27.35 2.20 
Rewarded  Q 20.01 11.34 
Partners   (83 percent)     
Exploited  Q 47.62 n/a 
Rewarded  n/a 13.42 
* Zero level is normalized in each treatment to the respective average 
buy rate (as shown in parentheses), taken over all encounters. 
 
In feedback markets, there are not only positive externalities from trust but also from 
trustworthiness.  The critical evidence for this comes from examining buyers’ reactions to their 
own history.  Extending the scope of Figure 5, Table 3 provides some sense of the relative 
 
12 Four buyers in feedback never faced a newbie and so are not included in these statistics.   20
importance of own experience, defined either as ‘rewarded’ if the buyer’s last order was shipped, 
or ‘exploited’ if it was not shipped.  Table 3 shows that, in all three markets, if a buyer was 
treated well in the past, he is more likely to trust in the future.   
There is, however, on display in Table 3, a difference between feedback and partners 
markets:  In partners markets, histories are perfectly aligned.  That is, a buyer’s trust is rewarded 
if and only if his seller is trustworthy, so that the two history effects always cumulate.  In 
feedback markets, on the other hand, the reputation effect is diluted by buyer’s experience based 
on his own history.  A trustworthy seller is less trusted when the buyer’s own experience was bad 
and an untrustworthy seller is more trusted when the buyer’s own experience was good.  Thus, 
there is a wedge driven between buyers’ and sellers’ histories in feedback markets that is (at least 
partly) responsible for why the marginal response to both the seller’s positive and negative 
feedback is on average weaker in feedback compared to partners (as shown in Figure 5).   
Although the wedge does not directly explain why overall average trust is lower in 
feedback, it does explain why sellers under-invest in trustworthiness, which in turn should lead 
to less trust: A seller who ships in the feedback market benefits only through the improved own 
reputation, but other sellers will profit from the induced good history of his buyer.  On the other 
hand, a seller who ships in partners contributes to his own good reputation and to a good history 
of his own future buyer.   In other words, the trust-inducing effects of trustworthiness are fully 
internalized in partners but not in feedback.  As a consequence, the overall private benefit from 
trustworthiness is weaker in feedback markets, which reduces the incentive to trade of both 
sellers and buyers. 
 
4.4  A probit model of buyer behavior 
Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 provide formal inferential support for the findings in the last 
section.  They also provide some further insight into how buyers evaluate seller histories. 
Model 2 replaces the round effect variables with variables reflecting the buyer’s history 
with shipping: the cumulative number of times he has bought and had the item shipped (CBSH) 21
and the cumulative number of buys that were not shipped (CBNH).   Comparing Model 2 to 
Model 1 permits a baseline check of the hypothesis that the experience effects we see in Model 1 
are due to differences in experiences with shippers against the omnibus hypothesis that they are 
due to differing market structure.  For example, there is less information for buyers to process in 
strangers, and this, instead of experience with shippers per se, might explain why the experience 
effect is greater in strangers than in the other treatments (see section 4.1).  If differing market 
structure were in fact responsible for the dynamic across rounds, then we would expect both C
..H
coefficients in Model 2 to be about the same, and certainly Model 2 should fit no better than 
Model 1.  In fact, the C
..H coefficients differ sharply and the likelihood of Model 2 is higher than 
that of Model 1, indicating that buyer experience with shippers is a good explanation for the 
differing dynamics across markets.
13 What we see in Model 2 is that a single negative 
experience – making a purchase and having a seller fail to ship – erodes buyer trust in the 
market, while a single positive experience builds a smaller amount of trust.  
The influence of buyer history persists in Model 3, where variables are added to reflect 
the information buyers have about sellers at the time they decide whether to purchase.  For the 
feedback market, we add variables to reflect the cumulative shipping history of the seller 
(TOTALSHIPS and TOTALNOSHIPS) and the most recent shipping history (SHIPLAST and 
NSHIPLAST).  In the partners market, the seller’s cumulative history is already reflected in the 
buyers C
..H variables.  So for partners, we need add only most recent history variables.  The 
FEEDBACK variable is dropped because it is not significant in the other two models.
14 
All of the information coefficients in Model 3 have the expected signs, save that for 
CBSH, but this estimate is small and not significant.  There are three main observations.  First, 
and most important for the present exposition, the CBNH variable is significantly negative, 
 
13 Models 1 and 2 are not nested and so not conducive to a formal inference test of the buyer experience hypothesis.  
If we re-estimate Model 1 with three CNBHx variables, one for each treatment x, all three of the new variables are 
negative and significant (two-tail p < 0.01 in all cases).  A full model, with history variables broken out by 
treatment, is given in Table B2 of Appendix B. 
14 Including it would make little difference to the estimates of Model 3 and the coefficient of FEEDBACK would 
still not be significant.  There are, however, some indications that FEEDBACK is collinear with 
SHIPLASTfeedback and NSHIPLASTfeedback. 22
verifying that seller behavior has the discussed externality.  Second, both feedback and partner 
buyers weigh recent observations more heavily than older ones (p = .0000 for both markets, 
Wald test).  Third, in feedback markets, NSHIPLAST has a more reliable effect on buyer 
decision than SHIPLAST, whereas partner buyers weight recent positive and negative history 
about the same. 
Model 3 also captures the information wedge effects:  First, buyers with the same buying 
history are more likely to trust newbies (who have no history) in the partners market than in 
either the strangers or feedback markets, as indicated by the coefficient for PARTNERS.   
Second, a partners seller who has been trustworthy in the recent past is granted higher trust than 
a feedback seller (SHIPLASTpartners is greater than SHIPLASTfeedback, two-tail p = 0.0007, 
Wald test), thus partners sellers have the greater incentive to be trustworthy.  Third (and related 
to the second effect), a decision not to ship has very similar immediate total negative effect on 
buying in both feedback and partners markets (compare NSHIPLASTfeedback and 
NSHIPLASTpartners), but that cost is borne by the seller only in the partners market.   
 
4.5 Payoffs 
One would correctly conclude from the analysis of the efficiency reached by the different 
markets in section 4.1 that average payoffs are smallest in strangers, larger in feedback, and 
larger still in partners.  In fact, the strategic incentives created by feedback systems also translate 
into positive correlations between trust(worthiness) and payoffs.  The Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients between subjects’ total payoffs and the total number of ship and buy in the strangers 
markets is negative (Q0.307, p = .034, for the frequency of buy and Q0.038, p = .795, for ship), 
making all trade activities unprofitable.  Sixteen out of 48 subjects receive total payoffs that are 
smaller than in a market in which nobody ever buys.  A feedback mechanism, on the other hand, 
makes trust and trustworthiness lucrative behavior.  The corresponding coefficients in the 
feedback market are significantly positive (.288, p = .047, for buy and .504, p = .000, for ship) 
and not a single subject made payoffs smaller than in a market with no trust.  Finally, the 23
pecuniary incentives to trade are strongest in partners markets (.706, p = .000, for buy and .728, 
p = .000 for ship).  While two subjects in this market received less than they could expect when 
no exchange ever takes place (both subjects never shipped to their partners but vainly tried to 
buy from them), 34 buyers and 31 sellers did their part of the exchange 14 or 15 times, numbers 
that are reached only once in strangers and feedback together. 
 
5.   Conclusions 
The findings from our experiment have a number of implications for the design of online 
feedback systems, as well as for further research into online reputation mechanisms and research 
into reputation building in general. 
One of the key findings concerns how a buyer’s own experience affects his trust in the 
entire market.  Specifically, a buyer whose trust has been betrayed tends to have diminished trust 
in all sellers, whereas a buyer whose trust has been rewarded continues to trust the market at 
about the same level as he did before.  In practice, online feedback is vulnerable to manipulation, 
and so less reliable than the feedbacks truthfully generated in our experiment.
15  The value of 
own experience in evaluating the trustworthiness of the market is therefore likely greater than 
our finding already suggests.  An important implication for online market design is that the 
public value of feedback information might be increased by informing market participants about 
the shipping probability in the entire market, and not only about the trustworthiness of individual 
traders.  Information indicating positive overall trust in the market might mitigate the negative 
effects of a trader’s own bad experience (while, of course, a negative overall market assessment 
might serve to aggravate it).   
We also found that buyers in online markets are rightly reluctant to bear the costs 
associated with verifying the trustworthiness of newbies.  In practice, many online market 
 
15 eBay distinguishes 4 forms of fraudulent feedbacks: defensive and offensive shill feedback (using secondary eBay 
user IDs or other eBay members to artificially raise the level of your own feedback or to leave negative comments 
for another user), feedback extortion (demanding any action of a fellow user that he or she is not required to do, at 
the threat of leaving negative feedback), and feedback solicitation (offering to sell feedback, trade feedback 
undeservedly, or buy feedback); see http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/investigates.html. 24
participants can change their identity at no costs, making it impossible for buyers to distinguish a 
‘real’ newbie, trading for the first time, from a ‘deceptive’ newbie, an experienced seller who got 
rid of his bad reputation.  The probability that a newbie is not trustworthy is therefore likely to be 
higher on real life platforms than on our laboratory platform.  The important implication is that 
market platforms should try to gain control over the agents’ identities (see Friedman and 
Resnick, 2001, for more theoretical reasons along these lines and how control can be realized; 
see also Ba, 2001, and Ba et al., 2003). 
Another design implication from our study comes from our finding that buyers put more 
weight on negative than positive feedback, and more on recent than old feedback.  The emphasis 
on recent negative feedback has also been reported in field studies (Lucking-Reiley et al., 1999, 
and Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002, among others).  In an experimental investigation, Keser 
(2002) finds that providing traders with only the most recent feedback information has by itself a 
significant impact on trust and trustworthiness, though efficiency is, in an intermediate phase of 
interaction, higher when trading partners are informed of the entire distribution of each other’s 
previous feedbacks.
16  Together, these findings suggest that relying solely on a cumulative 
measure of trustworthiness may not be appropriate because it hides information critical to the 
buyers’ decision to trust.  Another problem with relying solely on cumulative feedback measures 
comes from the fact that the seller’s actions have diminishing impact in influencing the buyers’ 
assessment of the trustworthiness.  This typically leads to increasing incentives to exploit one’s 
good reputation (see Holmstrom, 1999, for a model along these lines in a different context). 
We also found that our market participants exhibit a strong, systematic response to the 
strategic incentives created by a feedback mechanism.  In other words, most of the trust and 
trustworthy behavior we observed appears to flow from the incentives in the environment as 
opposed to some intrinsic drive to be trusting or trustworthy.  Nevertheless, we did identify some 
behavior – particularly sellers who shipped in the final rounds of play – that is not easily 
 
16 Keser’s findings are, however, not straightforwardly comparable to our results because her experimental design 
differs in a number of design choices, such as the game itself (e.g., efficiency gains occurred after the buyer’s move 
and were substantially higher), the matching and role assignment scheme (e.g., trading partners were matched more 
than once), feedback provision (voluntarily and endogenously given by buyers), etc. 25
explained by the incentives.  One of the important tasks for further research is a more detailed 
characterization of the nature and extent of this intrinsic incentive.  All present online feedback 
mechanisms rely on intrinsic motivation to some degree.  For example, the mechanisms typically 
provide participants with no incentive to take the time to report their experiences and to report 
honestly.  Since this sort of information is the heart of the system, it is important to know the 
extent to which intrinsic motivation is sufficient to provide it (Miller et al., 2003, recently 
proposed a payment-based system for getting buyers to rate transactions with sellers honestly 
and frequently). 
Our data rejects the information hypothesis and is thus inconsistent with standard 
economic theories of reputation building.  At the same time, our findings point to the reasons for 
the failure and thus suggest ways to capture the impact of information flows in new, extended 
models.  To be more precise, our finding that a seller’s reputation profile has predictive value for 
his future behavior, causing the information dilemma, is inconsistent with the sequential 
equilibrium model outlined in section 2.2.  In standard sequential equilibrium approaches to our 
game, reputation information, though critical for the emergence of trust, is not valuable in 
deciding whether to trust or not: In the early phase of the finitely repeated game all sellers 
always cooperate regardless of their preference-type (trustworthy or strategic) so that in 
equilibrium early play cannot reveal valuable information.  In all other periods, strategic sellers 
either play a mixed strategy such that buyers are indifferent between trusting and not trusting, or, 
once their reputation profile proves them as strategic players, never ship anymore.  Thus, in this 
second phase, a buyer cannot make more than his outside option regardless of his seller’s 
reputation profile.  However, the dynamics of reputation effects are known to be sensitive to the 
set of preferences that exists (see, e.g., Diamond, 1989).  It is conceivable that in a model in 
which some sellers are committed to behave trustworthy in all encounters, but some are 
committed to behave always untrustworthy (with the rest behaving strategically), a seller’s 
reputation might have predictive power, and so be more consistent with the data we have here.
17 
17 Avery et al. (1999) developed a related model of evaluations for goods with fixed but initially unknown quality.  
The more feedback is available, the less the uncertainty about the product’s true quality.  It may be unprofitable to 26
In addition, our observation that buyers condition their behavior on their own experience 
is not in line with sequential equilibrium approaches if one assumes that the seller-type 
distribution is commonly known.  However, an extended model that allows buyers to update 
their beliefs about the distribution as they gain experience might capture that buyers are more 
willing to trust after a positive experience, and less willing to trust if trust was exploited, and 
thus would be sensitive to the trader matching scheme.
18 
We conclude by elaborating on a comment we made in the introduction, that goes to the 
importance of reputation building in general: Granovetter (1985) argues that people have greater 
confidence in information when it comes from “a trusted informant” that has dealt with the 
individual in question than when the same information comes from a stranger or an institution, 
and that they have even greater confidence in information gained from first hand dealings.   
Specifically, Granovetter argues that first hand information (a) is usually cheaper to gather, (b) is 
often more detailed, (c) offers the promise of future business that provides a great motivation to 
be trustworthy, and (d) often become overlaid with social content.  These factors are likely 
important in practice, but they do not explain our data.  The essence of our findings is that buyer 
trust provides information to the market about individual sellers’ trustworthiness.  Seller 
trustworthiness enhances individual buyers’ confidence in the marketplace.  Even if reputations 
are shared and reliable, these externalities will not be internalized in transactions among 
strangers, so that both trust and trustworthiness will be underprovided. 
 
engage in behavior that would reduce uncertainty, and therefore reputable sellers may never be discovered.   
Dellarocas (forthcoming) surveys theories of reputation and relates them to online feedback mechanism. 
18 There are also non-strategic modeling approaches that are in line with the role of the buyers’ histories.  First, 
adaptation theories predict that people tend to choose strategies that performed well in the past (such as Roth and 
Erev’s, 1995, reinforcement learning theory or Selten’s, 1988, learning direction theory).  Hence, if trust was 
rewarded it has a higher probability of being chosen again.  Second, the own experience effect may reflect a non-
strategic (backward-looking) reciprocal motive.  Market participants may not be willing to cooperate in a market in 
which they were exploited.  This argument appears to have more bite in the partners market where not buy can be 
straightforwardly interpreted as a reciprocal punishment for unfair behavior against oneself.  The fact that the own 
experience effect also occurs in the reputation market suggests, however, that this unfairness aversion is also 
relevant among strangers (similar observations have been made by Blount, 1995, and Bolton et al., 2002, among 
others). 27
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Appendix A.  Subject instructions and buyer screen 
BELOW ARE THE WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN TO SUBJECTS IN THE FEEDBACK 
TREATMENT.  INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE OTHER TREATMENTS WERE PARALLEL, THE ONLY 
DIFFERENCES BEING THE DESCRIPTION OF THE FEEDBACK SYSTEM (REMOVED FOR STRANGERS), 
OR THE DESCRIPTION OF PARTNER ROTATION (PARTNERS).  The partners sessions were held on 
3/27/2002 1 PM, 3/27/2002 2 PM and 3/39/2002 10 AM; the feedback sessions were held on 3/15/2002 1 PM, 
3/15/2002 2 PM, and 4/08/2002 4 PM; the strangers sessions were held on 3/21/2002 9 AM, 3/21/2002 10 AM, and 
3/29/2002 11 AM. 
 
General.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions.  If at any time you have questions, 
raise your hand and a monitor will happily assist you.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized 
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.  
 
During the session you will play a game that gives you an opportunity to earn cash.  At the end of the session, you 
will be paid your earnings plus a $5 show-up fee.  Decisions and payments are confidential:  No one will be told 
your actions or the amount of money you make. 
 
[The figure that appeared here is the same as Figure 1 in the text of the paper.] 
Description of the game. You and the other participants in the room (but not the monitors) are the players in the 
game.  The game proceeds in a series of rounds.  Each round, each player is randomly matched with another player 
to trade a (fictional) commodity.  First, one of the players, the “Buyer,” chooses to either buy or not buy. If the 
Buyer chooses not buy, then the game ends and both players receive $.35.  If the Buyer chooses to buy, then the 
game continues and the other player, the “Seller,” makes a decision to ship or not ship. Ship pays each player $0.50 
while not ship pays the Buyer nothing and the Seller $0.70. 
 
The game will last for 30 rounds.  You will be a Buyer for half of the rounds, and a Seller for the other half.  When 
you switch between roles is a matter of random chance, so you may be in one role for more than one round in a row 
before switching to the other role, and the pattern of switching may be different for you than for other players in the 
game. 
 
Seller’s feedback history. For each game played, the computer will record whether the Seller chose ship or not ship 
(if the Seller did not get to move, the computer records nothing).  This feedback will then be made available to all 
future Buyers that are matched with this Seller.  The feedback will include a summary of the number of times the 
Seller shipped in the past, as well as a round-by-round history of their shipping decisions, beginning with the most 
recent decision.  Buyers will see this feedback history prior to making their buy decision.  
Pairings. All partner pairings are anonymous: Your identity will not be revealed to the person you are playing with 
either before, during or after the game. You will never be matched with the same player in the same role more than 
once.  
 
Money earnings.  You will be paid your earnings from all of the rounds of the game (plus a $5 show-up fee) in cash.  
 
Practice games.  When the monitor gives the OK, play some practice games.  Your partner for the practice games 
will be the computer.  It has been programmed to choose its moves at random.  The practice games will allow you to 
experience the game from both the Buyer and Seller’s perspective.  Practice until you feel comfortable with the 
game and its rules. 
 
Consent Forms.  If you wish to participate in this study, please read and sign the accompanying consent form.  The 
consent form explains your rights as a subject as well as the rules of confidentiality that will be adhered to regarding 
your participation. 31
Figure A1: A typical buyer screen 
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Appendix B.   
Table B1.  Fixed effects linear models, buyers
a
OLS estimates (and two-sided p-values) for buyer behavior 
Dependent variable = “1” for buy 
Independent variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
CONSTANT ---  ---  --- 
FEEDBACK 
= 1 if buyer is from feedback treatment, and 0 else. 
---  ---  --- 
PARTNERS 
  = 1 if buyer is from partners treatment, and 0 else. 
--- ---  --- 
TOTALSHIPSfeedback 





  = number of seller no ships prior to last order. 
  -0.035       
(.0092) 
SHIPLASTfeedback 
= 1 if feedback seller shipped last order, and 0 else. 
0.009      
(.8697) 
NSHIPLASTfeedback 
  = 1 if feedback seller did not ship last order, and 0 else. 
  -0.261     
(.0000) 
SHIPLASTpartners 
= 1 if seller in partners shipped last order, and 0 else. 
0.167      
(.0023) 
NSHIPLASTpartners 
  = 1 if seller in partners did not ship last order, and 0 else. 
-0.224       
(.0005) 
CBSH 
= number of past times item was shipped to buyer. 






  = number of past times buyer bought but not shipped. 






= round in strangers treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.184    
(.0000) 
ROUNDfeedback 
  = round in feedback treatment, and 0 else. 




= round in partners treatment, and 0 else. 
0.001    
(.6651) 
LAST2ROUNDstrangers 
  = 1 if round 29 or 30 in strangers treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.005   
(.9434) 
-0.069    
(.2393) 
-0.070     
(.2227) 
LAST2ROUNDfeedback 
= 1 if round 29 or 30 in feedback treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.301     
(.0000) 
-0.263   
(.0000) 
-0.263     
(.0000) 
LAST2ROUNDpartners 
  = 1 if round is 29 or 30 in partners treatment, and 0 else. 
-0.213     
(.0010) 
-0.136   
(.0225) 
-0.111       
(.0610) 












aThese are analogous estimates for Table 1 in the text. 
b History for Partner’s buyers does not include last transaction. 
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Table B2.  Random effects probit models, buyers
a
Maximum likelihood estimates and two-sided p-values for buyer behavior 
Dependent variable = “1” for buy 
Independent variable  Coefficient    p-value 
CONSTANT 0.512  0.0008 
PARTNERS 0.835  0.0016 
SHIPTOTALfeedback 0.077  0.0009 
NOSHIPTOTALfeedback -0.089  0.1194 
LASTSHIPfeedback 0.270  0.1520 
LASTNOSHIPfeedback -0.566  0.0073 
LASTSHIPpartners 1.184  0.0007 
LASTNOSHIPpartners -0.776  0.0127 
CBSHstrangers 0.003  0.9691 
CBSHfeedback -0.067  0.1171 
CBSHpartners 0.055  0.2151 
CBNHstrangers -0.382  0.0000 
CBNHfeedback -0.334  0.0000 
CBNHpartners -0.474  0.0000 
LAST2ROUNDSstrangers -0.420  0.1896 
LAST2ROUNDSfeedback -0.926  0.0001 
LAST2ROUNDSpartners -1.649  0.0000 
RHO 0.442  0.0000 
Number of observations 
Log-likelihood 
F-test p-value 
2160 
-985.78 
.0000 